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Slobodan Milosevic Cross-Examines Rade Markovic, July 26,
Part 1 of 2
Comments by Jared Israel
[Posted 14 September 2002]
=======================================
* Comment from the ICDSM*
Following this introduction is the transcript of the cross-examination of Rade Markovic by Slobodan Milosevic on 26 July 2002. It is copied exactly from The Hague 'tribunal' Website at http://www.un.org/icty/latest/index.htm
In this cross-examination Mr. Markovic refutes the allegations attributed to him that Slobodan Milosevic's government deliberately mistreated Albanians during the NATO attack on Yugoslavia in the spring 1999. Quite the contrary.
Moreover, Mr. Markovic testifies that he was bribed and coerced to give perjured testimony against Mr. Milosevic. And in response to a question from Mr. Milosevic, he says, yes, he was tortured.
This testimony has gone virtually unmentioned in the Western
media and with the notable exception of John Laughland's article in the Sunday
Mail, I know of no newspaper that has even mentioned the charge of torture. I
brought up this issue when I was interviewed by the BBC. I don't know whether it
was included in the BBC radio broadcast, but it was definitely excluded from the
BBC Internet article on the Milosevic trial that used parts of the interview.
For more on that, see "33 Days And Still No Answer: What Was Done
To Rade Markovic?" at
http://www.icdsm.org/more/bbc-rade.htm
and
"JARED
ISRAEL INTERVIEWED ON BBC" at
http://www.icdsm.org/more/bbc823.htm
Part 1 of the cross-examination deals with what happened in Kosovo. Part 2 includes the testimony about abuse and torture. You can access Part 2 at http://www.icdsm.org/more/july26-2.htm
-- Jared Israel
***
* * Cross-Examination Of Rade Markovic, Part 1 * *
16 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
17 Q. [Interpretation] Radomir, you read countless reports which, along
18 a variety of lines, were submitted by members of the state security sector
19 and which, through respective administrations, were all funneled to the
20 central headquarters; is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Since heads of state security services of every country are
23 usually the best-informed people in that country, and especially in view
24 of all those reports, did you ever get any kind of report or have you ever
25 heard of an order to forcibly expel Albanians from Kosovo?
Page 8727
1 A. I never got such a report, nor I --
2 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you, for this reason: That both
3 you and the accused speak the same language. Everything has got to be
4 interpreted. So would you pause between his question and your answer.
5 And Mr. Milosevic, will you remember to do the same, kindly.
6 Yes. If you'd give your answer.
7 A. No, I never heard of such an order, nor have I seen such an order,
8 nor was it contained in the reports I received. Nobody, therefore, ever
9 ordered for Albanians from Kosovo to be expelled.
10 Q. Did you receive any information which would point to such a thing,
11 to the existence of an order, a plan, a decision, a suggestion, or a de
12 facto influence that Albanians from Kosovo were to be expelled?
13 A. No, I never heard of such a suggestion. I know of no plan or
14 design or instruction to expel Albanians from Kosovo.
15 Q. And at the meetings that you attended, not only those where the
16 army and the MUP were represented, but also the senior staff meetings of
17 the ministry, which I suppose were chaired by your minister, and meetings
18 in my office, is it true that completely the opposite was said; we always
19 insisted that civilians should be protected, that civilians should be
20 taken care of, so that they are not hurt in the course of anti-terrorist
21 operations. Do you remember that?
22 A. Certainly. The task was not only to protect Serb civilians, but
23 also the Albanian population and citizenry. Members of the Ministry of
24 the Interior had the task and duty to protect both groups of civilians in
25 Kosovo.
Page 8728
1 Q. Do you remember, Radomir, that in all the reports of the generals
2 who had been on tours in Kosovo - and this is precisely a confirmation of
3 what I'm trying to say - on multiple occasions, many examples were given
4 of members of the KLA being allowed to flee, together with groups of
5 civilians, only because the police never opened fire in situations where
6 some of the civilians could have been in danger, despite the fact that
7 members of the KLA were clearly visible among them? Do you remember those
8 reports?
9 A. I remember that. There had been a number of examples of members
10 of the KLA wearing civilian clothes on top of their uniforms, and in
11 situations when they thought their life was in jeopardy, they took off
12 their uniforms and mingled with the civilians.
13 Q. Now let's go one level below. I don't mean in the sense of
14 hierarchy, in the system of values, I mean. Have you ever received a
15 report during your entire tenure as a civil servant, as a citizen, or head
16 of the state security service, have you ever received a report or heard
17 that I myself, or any of my associates, or any politician, ever encouraged
18 or incited discrimination against or expelling or persecution of ethnic
19 Albanians in Kosovo?
20 A. No, I've never heard or seen anything like that.
21 Q. And did you hear anyone else, either from the police or the army,
22 ordering, inciting, planning, or suggesting in any way that civilians,
23 ethnic Albanians in Kosovo Metohija, should be killed, discriminated
24 against, persecuted, or anything like that?
25 A. No, I've never heard anything of the sort. I said a moment ago
Page 8729
1 already that our task was to preserve lives and the security of civilians
2 in Kosovo, both Albanian and Serbian.
3 Q. During all the time that we are discussing here in this room, did
4 you ever have in front of you a report of any kind to the effect that
5 members of state or public Security Services have committed some sort of
6 war crime as part of a plan carried out by the state security service or
7 the public security service or the army or anyone who was armed?
8 A. No. No crimes. I had no information about crimes. There had
9 been a number of crimes perpetrated by individuals in Kosovo, among both
10 the army and the police. Those perpetrators who were identified were duly
11 prosecuted, and we saw in one of the documents yesterday, in item 8 it
12 says that: "All perpetrators of any criminal offences committed in Kosovo
13 had to be prosecuted duly."
14 Q. Is it true that whenever there was a suspicion or it was obvious
15 that a member of the police or the army had committed any sort of criminal
16 offence, there was no discussion at all? Legal measures were taken
17 immediately, in accordance with the law, criminal reports were filed and
18 went through the due process?
19 A. I believe that over 200 such criminal reports were actually filed
20 against members of the service, and they were prosecuted. It is also
21 known from reports of the army of Yugoslavia that they did the same thing,
22 and the number of their own criminal reports was close to ours, if not
23 higher.
24 Q. Do you remember, conditionally speaking, I can't call them large
25 meetings, but speaking of meetings held in the office of head of state, a
Page 8730
1 meeting of 10 to 15 people is a large meeting. During that at such
2 meetings I always said that it is part of the Serb tradition that a
3 prisoner of war is something sacred, an unarmed man is something sacred,
4 that we should preserve our honour and that that can only be done if war
5 criminals in a state of war try to commit a crime, that every such crime
6 had to be punished immediately?
7 A. Yes, I remember that. You didn't say that just once; you said
8 that on many occasions, and I remember that as well as everyone who
9 attended those meetings.
10 Q. I will read out to you from some of my notes. I don't assume you
11 remember each and every one of these documents, with you do you remember
12 the orders which were then circulated around the Ministry of the Interior?
13 They went down from the general command, downwards, concerning the
14 procedure for treating captured terrorists, and said that even they should
15 be treated in keeping with the rules of international humanitarian law,
16 the laws and customs of war, and the Geneva Conventions. Do you remember
17 that order?
18 A. Yes. Members of the MUP applied all the laws and rules which were
19 mandatory under such circumstances, and they treated even terrorists, in
20 keeping with Geneva Conventions.
21 Q. Do you remember, for instance, a special order from the Supreme
22 Command concerning a ban on torching civilian Albanian houses, seizing
23 property, et cetera?
24 A. This was discussed more than once, and specifically there was this
25 ban on which you insisted, as well as the leadership of the MUP and the
Page 8731
1 army of Yugoslavia, that houses in Kosovo must not be set on fire and
2 nothing must be stolen.
3 Q. There was a special order that everyone should be treated
4 humanely, including any member of the enemy forces who surrendered, and
5 their lives should be spared. I'll read out to you some of these things.
6 Perhaps you don't remember all of them, but there are orders to the effect
7 that perpetrators should immediately be brought between the competent
8 court martial, the order that in the course of combat operations,
9 provisions of the international military law must apply at all times.
10 These summaries were available to everyone and notified to everyone?
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness answer.
12 A. I don't remember these orders individually, but I remember the
13 subject we've just discussed. I remember your general approach and the
14 position of the army of Yugoslavia and the Ministry of the Interior, that
15 is, to respect all provisions of international law on the territory where
16 combat operations were taking place, and concerning the treatment of
17 captured members of terrorist organisations. I don't remember individual
18 orders, because they didn't reach me, for the most part, me personally, I
19 mean. They were directed to the Ministry of the Interior.
20 Q. All right. Let's move on. You submitted your report to the
21 Minister of the Interior and you made them at staff meetings of the
22 ministry, regular meetings, chaired by the Minister of the Interior. Is
23 that the regular procedure followed by the ministry, that is, the top
24 leadership of the ministry?
25 A. Yes, that is the regular procedure. Every Tuesday, at the office
Page 8732
1 of the Ministry of the Interior, in the headquarters of the ministry,
2 senior staff meetings were held, attended by members of the Ministry of
3 the Interior, including the head of the state security sector and his
4 deputy.
5 Q. When you came to my office, Vlajko Stojilkovic, yourself, and
6 others -- or let me speak about you alone. When you came to see me, is it
7 true that most often you were together with your minister; that is, the
8 Minister of the Interior and head of the state security sector, in light
9 of the issues that were discussed, and very rarely, from time to time, you
10 came alone to clarify a certain issue which was within your purview? Is
11 that correct? Is that a fair description?
12 A. Yes, that's correct.
13 Q. In the same way, you also called on the president of the Republic
14 of Serbia, the prime minister of Serbia, providing them with relevant
15 information, not to speak of your contacts with your own minister. I am
16 not going to speak about your in-house matters. Your communication was
17 certainly more frequent. But those were the regular relations; is that
18 correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. As for these reports, last night I saw in the media that it says
21 information, et cetera, et cetera. Of course. I received information,
22 just like the President of the Republic of Serbia, the Prime Minister and
23 before that of course the Minister of the Interior, I received daily
24 information from the service that was then photocopied and sent to us for
25 our own information. Is that correct?
Page 8733
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 Q. As for Kosovo, these reports contained information -- you can
3 perhaps add something to this. I am saying what is my own assertion --
4 about the security situation in Kosovo, about weapons coming in, about the
5 information that was being received, about the existence of the KLA, about
6 crimes that they committed. Is that correct?
7 A. For the most part, that is what the information contained.
8 Q. Is it correct that, to the best of your knowledge, and also the
9 knowledge acquired by your service - I'm not referring to your personal
10 knowledge; I'm referring to your knowledge in the capacity of head of this
11 service, and on the basis of the reports received - was there terrorism in
12 Kosovo?
13 A. Yes, there was terrorism in Kosovo.
14 Q. Is it correct that a large number of our policemen and soldiers,
15 and then civilians too, both of Serb, Montenegrin, Albanian, and other
16 ethnicities, got killed in Kosovo during terrorist actions?
17 A. Over 200 members of the Ministry of the Interior were killed in
18 Kosovo. Over 300 of them were wounded. I think that over 300 members of
19 the army of Yugoslavia lost their lives in Kosovo as well. Among them
20 were civilians too.
21 Q. Is it correct that in Kosovo the police defended the citizens and
22 their property from terrorism?
23 A. The police had the task - I already said that - to protect both
24 the Serb and the Albanian population, because terrorists often turned on
25 their own people, and they insisted that they either join the ranks of the
Page 8734
1 KLA or participate in some other way in these terrorist actions. The
2 people did not accept that. And very often it would happen that they
3 would seek protection of the members of the Ministry of the Interior.
4 Q. That is one of the questions that I wanted to put to you, because
5 otherwise both military commanders and police commanders at these meetings
6 reported that entire villages that were purely Albanian sought protection
7 from the police in order to be protected from the terrorists, from the
8 terrorist lootings, kidnappings, et cetera. Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, that is correct. Such reports did come in from the army of
10 Yugoslavia and the Ministry of the Interior. We discussed that, and the
11 instructions were to help such people.
12 Q. To the best of your knowledge, although you, Radomir, were not
13 involved in politics ever in your life, but to the best of your knowledge,
14 in view of the position that you held, do you know that we did everything
15 to find an agreement, to reach an agreement, so that the dispute in Kosovo
16 would be resolved by peaceful means and that all of you were instructed to
17 take particular care of the security and safety of Ibrahim Rugova and
18 others because there were showdowns between them too and even their lives
19 could have been in danger? Is that correct?
20 A. Yes. The representatives of the government of Serbia I think went
21 at least 14 times to negotiate with the Albanians in Kosovo, and they did
22 not come there, and I know that President Milutinovic went at least twice
23 with regard to that particular matter, to Kosovo. And I also know that
24 Rugova's life was protected. It was endangered, precisely by his own
25 people, the Albanians. And after that, after his life was saved,
Page 8735
1 literally, he was brought to Serbia, and after that he was allowed to go
2 wherever he wanted to go, both he and his family. I don't know where he
3 went. And the members of our service even took care of them in Kosovo. I
4 heard that he denied that, but this is correct.
5 Q. All right. Is it correct -- I think that we should clarify a
6 general point. Is it correct that not a single employee of the MUP -- I'm
7 putting this question because constant reference is being made here to
8 some kind of crimes that were committed by the army and the police, and my
9 assertion is being challenged that the army and the police were defending
10 the country, not committing crimes. Is it correct that not a single
11 employee of the MUP, according to the existing laws, and also according to
12 the concrete instructions that they had received, were not supposed to
13 carry out any order that was contrary to the law?
14 A. Members of the Ministry of the Interior act in accordance with
15 laws that are in force. That is to say, what is binding upon them is
16 primarily the Law on Criminal Procedure, and also the law on employment in
17 the interior. These are the most important regulations that regulate how
18 members of the service are supposed to act. They should not carry out a
19 criminal act even if they were issued such an order.
20 Q. But they should also not, not, react, even if a crime is committed
21 in their presence, even if an order was issued to that effect?
22 A. Absolutely. This was regulated by law.
23 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Interpreters. Remember the
24 interpreters, Mr. Milosevic.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
Page 8736
1 Q. A policeman who sees the commission of a crime, even a
2 misdemeanour, the commission of a misdemeanour, a pickpocket doing
3 whatever, not to mention rape or a murder, whatever, he doesn't have to
4 wait for any kind of order. It is by law that he is supposed to react in
5 the case of such a perpetrator. Is that correct or not?
6 A. Yes, that is correct.
7 Q. Reference was made here to the effect that some individuals were
8 outside the borders of Serbia. I'll come to that. But I want to clarify
9 something else before that. Is it correct that there was not a single
10 decision to this effect, or order, that members of the MUP of Serbia be
11 sent anywhere outside the borders of Serbia?
12 A. I am not aware of any such order. At my time, when I was head of
13 the state security sector, there was no such order in existence.
14 Q. I want to clarify something, because with regard to certain
15 matters, when time is disregarded as a factor, then they look different.
16 You talked about Radovan Stojicic, Badza, and you also said that for a
17 while he was in eastern Slavonia. Is it correct that in eastern Slavonia
18 he was a volunteer, not a representative of the Ministry of the Interior?
19 A. As far as I know, he was commander of the Territorial Defence,
20 which constitutes a formation of volunteers.
21 Q. Let us just look into another important matter. At that time --
22 because this is being linked to the fact that he was Deputy Minister of
23 the Interior and head of the public security sector. At that time he did
24 not have any links whatsoever with the position of the head of public
25 security or the position of Deputy Minister of the Interior, at the time
Page 8737
1 when he was there as a volunteer.
2 A. Yes. It was only after that that he was appointed to that
3 position. At that time he was a member of the special units, or he was an
4 advisor to the Minister of the Interior in relation to special units.
5 Q. Something was said here about manning the special terrorist unit
6 and also something that had to do with volunteers and that this was
7 organised by Arkan. Is it correct that that unit, to the best of your
8 knowledge, had its criteria, individual criteria, in terms of employing
9 persons, or rather, that this was no takeover of Arkan's unit? Each
10 individual who was taken into service was looked at on an individual
11 basis?
12 A. Yes. They were not taken over as a unit. All of those who met
13 the criteria, the requirements of the Ministry of the Interior, were taken
14 into the unit, that is to say, only those who met the requirements that
15 were put by the Ministry of the Interior.
16 Q. In response to some questions here, you referred to the following:
17 That you reorganised that unit when you came to your position, that you
18 scaled it down, that you changed its structure, et cetera. Did anybody
19 interfere as far as that was concerned?
20 A. No. I did that in agreement with the Minister of the Interior,
21 and I had permission to do that.
22 Q. So nobody was exerting any influence on you in terms of retaining
23 someone or taking somebody else in or to scale down or not to scale down?
24 You did that in accordance with your own assessment as to the scaling down
25 of that unit? You thought that was necessary, that it should be defined
Page 8738
1 exclusively as an anti-terrorist unit, et cetera, and that is how you
2 carried this out, without anybody's special influence or pressure to do
3 anything?
4 A. No, there was no pressure. This was a conclusion of the senior
5 staff meeting of the state security service. We agreed that that is what
6 we should do. I proposed that to the minister. The minister agreed. And
7 nobody brought any pressure to bear on me.
8 Q. Apart from these regular communications between the minister and
9 you and your deputy, did anybody from the outside interfere in any of the
10 internal matters of the state security section?
11 A. No. This was within the competencies of the Minister of the
12 Interior only. Whatever he observed and whatever he intended to have done
13 with regard to both sectors, he would carry out. But of course when
14 consulting the staff and the head of the state security. So this was an
15 agreement that was pursued without any pressures, simply by way of
16 agreement.
17 Q. You mentioned a map. He was asking -- I mean the other side,
18 Mr. Nice, asked you to explain some map. As far as I understand this,
19 this map shows the places where various members of that unit which was
20 established later, where they fought as volunteers somewhere, and in
21 various places, not where the unit, as a unit of the Ministry of the
22 Interior, was used in these activities. Do you have any idea about that?
23 A. I did tell the gentleman, the investigators of The Hague Tribunal,
24 to have a look at that map for themselves, because I assume that it is
25 there until the present day, because the unit is still in existence. At
Page 8739
1 that time I was not head of the state security sector, and I do not know
2 where, in which places, members of the special unit were at different
3 points in time. It is possible that this was some other unit that was
4 transformed later. It is possible that these were people who, for the
5 most part, came from that part of our country, former country, that is,
6 and that after that they established a unit for special operations.
7 Q. After that, as far as I understand matters, a number of them were
8 taken into the unit for special operations, according to the criteria that
9 met the requirements of the service itself.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Psychologically, physically, and in every other way, in terms of
12 membership in an anti-terrorist unit, I assume.
13 A. Yes. I point out that I am not competent to discuss that period,
14 because this is a period when that unit and the service, the sector, were
15 headed by Jovica Stanisic, and he will certainly be in a better position
16 to speak about that.
17 Q. And now with regard to what Mr. Nice asked you, is it correct that
18 we did have information at our disposal that Raznjatovic, who, as a
19 volunteer, with his comrades, did take part in combat operations,
20 primarily as a patriot, not as a criminal, as it is being ascribed, had
21 certain illegal operations that he was involved in, that is, information
22 that we received, and he justified this by saying that he needed money in
23 order to help the families of his wounded and killed comrades.
24 A. Yes, that is the information that we received.
25 Q. And now, in relation to that information: Did I not give an
Page 8740
1 instruction to you? Before that you were head of the police, of the
2 capital city, and you had the greatest experience and you held such a high
3 position. I asked you to call him in and to tell him that no illegal
4 activity could be tolerated, irrespective of reasons that are humanitarian
5 nature, and that he has to turn to legal operations only? Is that
6 correct?
7 A. That was your instruction.
8 Q. I did not say that he should legalise crime. I said that no crime
9 would be tolerated and that he could be involved in legal matters only; is
10 that correct?
11 A. That is correct, and that is what I said to The Hague Tribunal's
12 investigators.
13 Q. They usually twist things the way in which suits them, so that's
14 why I want this to be quite accurate?
15 JUDGE MAY: A that's not a comment that is proper for you to make.
16 Yes.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Did you get any report on the activity of paramilitary formations
19 in Kosovo before the NATO bombing?
20 A. No. I said that a short while ago, that as far as I know, there
21 were no paramilitary formations in Kosovo.
22 Q. Did you hear, regardless of the fact that of course there was an
23 order to that effect, did you hear me personally insisting that not a
24 single paramilitary formation should be allowed to exist? Because it's
25 usually a band of robbers, that every, each and every one of them had to
Page 8741
1 be arrested, disarmed. And to finish with this topic, because every now
2 and then we hear that they volunteered -- I said that if they volunteered,
3 then they had to be regular members of the army of Yugoslavia, that no
4 gangs may be admitted into the army as a group. If they volunteered in
5 the first place, they had to be deployed in various units, as individual
6 members, to avoid any possibility of abuse. Did I say that?
7 A. Yes, and that's precisely what I told the gentleman from the group
8 of the investigators of the Tribunal. I said that all the volunteers went
9 through the due procedure of admission and became regular members of the
10 army of Yugoslavia.
11 Q. And before you became head of the state security sector, before
12 you assumed that position, did you have any information about any alleged
13 war crimes on the territory of the former Yugoslavia in which members of
14 the state security service, the SUP, or the army of Yugoslavia would have
15 been involved?
16 A. No. Since I was a member of the Ministry of the Interior and I
17 had a senior position in that Ministry of the Interior, I would have
18 known, I suppose.
19 Q. Well, even before that, you were head of the public security in
20 the capital, and Deputy Minister of the Interior. You would have known
21 about such things.
22 A. That's correct. As head of the Belgrade Secretariat, I was not
23 Deputy Minister of the Interior, I was below that level. It was only
24 later I became deputy minister. And as head of the Belgrade city
25 Secretariat, I was not informed of the work of members of the Ministry of
Page 8742
1 the Interior, but I would have certainly heard of something like that,
2 something of that order.
3 Q. Let us return to the main issue. To the best of your knowledge, I
4 mean the knowledge available to the service and your personal knowledge as
5 head of that service, did you know that the main reason for migrations
6 during the war was the bombing? Is that correct or not?
7 A. Certainly one of the reasons of migration was the bombing.
8 Q. Is it also true that another reason were the efforts to avoid
9 direct clashes, conflicts, in which the army and the police fight with the
10 KLA, and efforts to remove the citizenry from the area, the theatre of
11 combat operations?
12 A. Yes, certainly that was one more reason.
13 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now. It's time. We'll adjourn
14 for 20 minutes. Would you be back, then, please, Mr. Markovic.
15 --- Recess taken at 10.35 a.m.
16 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Radomir, you are talking about the political body that was headed
20 by Nikola Sainovic. My first question is: Is it true that this body, as
21 you said yourself, was a political one?
22 A. I can't think of another term for that, but it was some kind of
23 coordination body and it was made up of people who dealt in politics. So
24 I define it as a political body, and perhaps I was not the only one who
25 defined it that way.
Page 8743
1 Q. Indubitably, a political body is one which has political goals.
2 The staff, the police staff, Sreten Lukic headed it, had police tasks, the
3 army had military tasks, that is, everyone had their own task. I would
4 take, for an example, one of the documents shown by the opposite side
5 yesterday, that is, a report of the Ministry of the Interior of the
6 Republic of Serbia that was quoted yesterday here. They actually said it
7 referred to two days, whereas it says here "Summary of events,
8 occurrences, and information of importance registered in the period for --
9 from 0600 hours on the 27th of March to 0600 hours on 28th March," which
10 means 24 hours. This staff reported up the line to the office of the
11 minister and copied to the head of the public security sector, the head of
12 the state security sector, Radomir Markovic, assistant minister Obrad
13 Stevanovic, another assistant, Minister Misic, the administration of crime
14 investigation police, the administration for analysis and information, the
15 operative centre, and the secretariats of the interior, that is, heads of
16 secretariats, indicating numbers of the secretariats and these are the
17 secretariats of the interior in Kosovo and Metohija? Right? So it's
18 clear that as far as the police is concerned, it operated up the line,
19 along the vertical chain. It is also clear from the military papers
20 presented by the opposite side here that the army also followed its own
21 vertical chain. Is that correct?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. In view of the existence of this political body, are you aware
24 that there was also a temporary Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija,
25 or a provisional Executive Council, that is, the government of Kosovo and
Page 8744
1 Metohija, headed by Andjelkovic, who was also there the whole time?
2 A. Yes, I'm aware of that.
3 Q. Do you know that this government of Kosovo and Metohija, this
4 provisional government, was made up of representatives of all ethnic
5 groups: Serbs, Albanians, the Romany, Gorani, Muslims, all the ethnic
6 groups that populated Kosovo?
7 A. Yes, I know that.
8 Q. Do you know that this government was engaged in resolving
9 day-to-day economic, financial, social, health-related, and a variety of
10 other issues that had to do with taking care and accommodating internally
11 displaced persons and all the normal problems that the government normally
12 deals with, this government in particular was a provisional one, though?
13 A. Yes, I know that.
14 Q. All right. Is it then clear that this political body that existed
15 there, all those civil servants, Sainovic as deputy prime minister,
16 Andjelkovic as president of the provisional Executive Council, and other
17 public officials who had their respective positions, they were not part of
18 the chain of command. Its purpose was to effect exchange of information
19 and consultations, although along the vertical respective chains of
20 command, the police effected command as they were supposed to, according
21 to the law, and so did the army, each one according to their own vertical
22 chains, along their vertical chains of command?
23 A. I said myself that this body had the task of providing
24 coordination between the army and the Ministry of the Interior, but I
25 didn't say that they had the last word in it.
Page 8745
1 Q. All right. Let's translate that into a practical language. Was
2 this political body in charge of you? Did they command you?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Was this political body able to command Vlajko Stojilkovic?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Did they command Ojdanic or Pavkovic?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Do you know that every event, as this report indicates, all events
9 from 0600 hours on one day to 0600 hours on the following day, every event
10 relevant to the army is reported from the level of a unit up the vertical
11 chain to the brigade, the corps, the command? Do you know about that?
12 A. I suppose that subordination and the vertical chain of command
13 exists in the army as well, but I don't know exactly how the reporting
14 goes. I believe it is identical to that of the Ministry of the Interior.
15 Q. All right. But knowing Vlajko Stojilkovic, do you believe that he
16 would have allowed anyone else to take decisions on engagement of the
17 police without his knowledge and explicit consent, approval?
18 A. No. Consent was certainly required, and not only consent of the
19 Minister of the Interior.
20 Q. Did Vlajko Stojilkovic, at your in-house meetings and senior-staff
21 meetings, did he always insist that every single action had to be in
22 strict accordance with the law at all times?
23 A. Absolutely. Vlajko Stojilkovic always strongly insisted on legal
24 action.
25 Q. Did Sreten Lukic, Obrad Stevanovic, Vlastimir Djordjevic, and all
Page 8746
1 his subordinates insist on the same thing? Was it also their duty, their
2 task, and their personal conviction as well?
3 A. Concerning actions of members of the Ministry of the Interior, no
4 action could be illegal. Everything had to be in accordance with the law.
5 Q. You spoke about the fact that Pavkovic reported from the ground.
6 Do you remember that he reported mainly about the deployment of KLA
7 forces, their strength, he reported on problems they were encountering on
8 the ground, on the current situation, using maps, in the presence of a
9 broad circle of leaders?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. From these orders that the opposite side exhibited here and which
12 you had occasion to review because they were shown to you, is it
13 abundantly clear that the subject-matter and the discussion was always the
14 terrorist groups and their actions?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. A moment ago, during your examination-in-chief, you said the
17 activities of that body had to be approved. You "assume" by Belgrade. So
18 is it reasonable to assume is that it was a case of pursuing the policy,
19 which meant eliminating terrorism, protecting the citizenry from
20 terrorism? Do you believe it is a legitimate right of the state and also
21 the duty of the police, the army, and everyone else who is enforcing the
22 law on a certain territory?
23 A. Combatting terrorism is not only the right but also the duty, and
24 falls within the competence of every state and its organs.
25 Q. Mr. Nice also asked you about who my associates were. He asked
Page 8747
1 you to identify them. And from your answers to his questions, I heard you
2 say president of the federal parliament, president of the republican
3 parliament, president of the Republic of Serbia, president of the
4 government, that is, the prime minister, and their top officials of the
5 state. Also when you speak about the coordination in Kosovo and Metohija,
6 you mentioned politicians, the army, the police, public officials. How
7 can we then talk about - how shall I put it? - private policies and
8 private command if meetings are being held of the entire political and
9 military top echelon without any outsiders present, so only people who are
10 in very responsible public positions? The top officials of the state, the
11 police, the state security, leaders who are reviewing certain political
12 and military options. Was that the practice?
13 A. Yes. Those meetings were devoted to precisely those subjects.
14 Q. Is it true that this political coordination and briefing on the
15 estimates of the army addressed to the representatives of the federal and
16 the republican government, the provisional council of Kosovo and Metohija,
17 isn't it right that these bodies cannot be interpreted to have been part
18 of the chain of command? It was just coordination and exchange of
19 information about the situation, whereas command was effected along the
20 proper chain of command, both in the army and the police? Is that
21 correct?
22 A. Well, that's the term I used: "coordination."
23 Q. What was mentioned here in some testimonies was that Sainovic was
24 in charge of operations in Kosovo. Can that seem probable at all that the
25 deputy federal prime minister, in addition to all the professionals in the
Page 8748
1 chain of command in the army and the police, who were trained for that
2 kind of thing, is in charge of some kind of operations, operations in the
3 sense of military and police operations, things like that?
4 A. I don't think that he was an expert who could carry out military
5 and police operations. He could only carry through that which was
6 mentioned at meetings that were held in your office that showed how the
7 state was supposed to function in Kosovo.
* [Transcript is continued "Cross-Examination, Part 2," at
http://www.icdsm.org/more/july26-2.htm *
***** Urgent Message from Sloboda (Freedom) Association and the International Committee to Defend Slobodan Milosevic!
The Freedom Association in Belgrade and the ICDSM, based outside Yugoslavia, are the two organizations formed at the request of Slobodan Milosevic to aid in his defense.
Up until now our main work has been threefold. We have publicized the truth about The Hague's phony trial. We have organized research to help President Milosevic expose NATO's lies. And we have initiated legal action in the Dutch and European Courts.
Now our job has increased. The defense phase of the "trial" starts in May 2003. No longer will Mr. Milosevic be limited to cross-examining Hague witnesses. The prosecution will be forced further onto the defensive as victims of NATO's aggression and experts from Yugoslavia and the NATO countries tell what really happened and expose media lies. Moreover, Mr. Milosevic will call leaders, from East and West, some friendly and some hostile to the truth.
The controlled mass media will undoubtedly try to suppress this testimony as they have tried to suppress Mr. Milosevic's cross-examinations. Nevertheless this phase of the "trial" will be the biggest international forum ever to expose NATO's use of racism, violence and lies to attack Yugoslavia.
We urgently need the help of all people who care about what is happening in The Hague. Right now, Nico Steijnen , the Dutch lawyer in the ICDSM, is waging legal battles in the Dutch courts and before the European Court, about which more news soon. These efforts urgently require financial support. We now maintain a small staff of Yugoslav lawyers in Holland, assisting and advising Mr. Milosevic full-time. We need to expand our Dutch facilities, perhaps bringing in a non-Yugoslav attorney full-time. Definitely we must guarantee that we have an office and office manager available at all times, to compile and process evidence and for meetings with witnesses and lawyers and as a base for organizing press conferences.
All this costs money. And for this, we rely on those who want Mr. Milosevic to have the best possible support for attacking NATO's lies.
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