URL for this article:
http://www.icdsm.org/document/verdict.htm
Send this article to a friend!
=======================================
BELGRADE LAW PROFESSORS'
VERDICT
=======================================
In their aggression against the law
and justice, NATO&Soros clerks in the so-called
"International Criminal Tribunal for Former
Yugoslavia" based in the Hague, decided to ignore,
as essentially unpleasant for their dirty work, the
initiative of leading law experts and law professors of
Belgrade University to appear in the court room as real
AMICI CURIAE (in its real meaning - as FRIENDS OF
JUSTICE) and expose monstrous character of this
institution, for long time successfully hidden from
public.
Instead, they have appointed three
attorneys (from Holland, England and Yugoslavia), proven
as real FRIENDS OF (WHITE) HOUSE, to serve as
quasidefense for president Milosevic. That way their
attempted trial of president Milosevic would become the
greatest political FARCE ever seen. Belgrade professors
already condemned in press conference such illegal and
absurd decision of both "Tribunal" and those
three attorneys. Accepting such a role they should lose
their licenses, Belgrade professors stated.
For the sake of justice, the full
text of the initiative of Belgrade law professors, is
hereby given.
TO
THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE PROSECUTION OF PERSONS
RESPONSIBLE FOR SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW COMMITTED IN THE TERRITORY OF THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA SINCE 1991
To
the Trial Chambers in all the cases before the Tribunal
PROPOSAL
FOR APPEARANCE BEFORE TRIAL CHAMBERS BY VIRTUE OF RULE 74
ON PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (AMICUS
CURIAE)
The
Professors and Assistant Lecturers of the Faculty of Law
of the University of Belgrade have been following with
great attention the work of the International Tribunal
for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991, as the
institution that, by a number of elements, is new and
specific and all the more interesting therefore from the
purely theoretical standpoint and then also as an organ
whose work will strongly affect the current and future
situation in the space of our country and the situation
throughout the region. A large group of teachers and
associates of our institution has already in the country
itself taken initiatives in order to ensure respect for
the constitutionality and legality in the field of
prosecution of persons charged with violations of
international humanitarian law and especially in the
field of respect for the legal norms concerning
fundamental human rights. It is our firm belief that the
prosecution of perpetrators of criminal offences which
have violated international humanitarian law is one of
the imperatives and prerequisites for the normalisation
of relations and for restoring stability in the space of
the former Yugoslavia just as it is the case in all
regions of the world where such offences were and are
still being committed and are regrettably a regular
corollary of virtually all wars and conflicts. However,
we also firmly believe that one cannot create law out of
non-law and that therefore when prosecuting and trying in
court even such serious offences as those that the
Tribunal has been dealing with, the rules of
international law must be strictly respected and
particularly those among them that protect fundamental
human rights and freedoms that are of a universal nature
and that as jus cogens, within the framework of
international law, have a hierarchically superior
position vis-a-vis the majority of other rules. This
action-taking in accordance with the law is everywhere a
necessity that cannot be called into question. However,
in the case of the conflicts that took place in the past
ten years or so in the former SFRY, respect for law is
all the more essential as these were conflicts that left
tragic consequences on virtually all peoples in these
parts, conflicts that represent at the same time both the
expression and the integral part of the tragic fate of
these peoples, whose troublesome past left behind a
number of disputes and unresolved situations over which
they quarrelled and waged wars also throughout their
history and over which they continue to quarrel even
today.
Bearing
in mind both the mentioned necessity of strictly
respecting law, both generally and specifically regarding
the issues related to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, and the huge real importance that the
Tribunal and its works have for our country and the
region, for our fate and the fate of future generations
in these parts, we consider it important and from the
standpoint of our human and our professional conscience
necessary to approach the Tribunal and request that our
representatives be allowed by the Trial Chambers in the
above mentioned proceedings to appear in accordance with
Rule 74 on procedure and evidence before the Trial
Chambers conducting these proceedings and present for
each of these proceedings their specific objections based
on the general objections that we shall make in this
correspondence, which concern respect of international
law in the Tribunal’s work and in particular the
norms protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.
We
were prompted to take this step also by the statement by
Judge May during the first appearance of former President
Slobodan Milosevic before the Tribunal, to the effect
that the international law would be applied to the
accused in future. This would have to mean also that in
the course of proceedings the Tribunal would respect all
of his human rights, both those prescribed by the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and
others. This statement, of course, also applies to all
other indicted persons.
We
wish to point out that we decided to approach the
Tribunal in this way even though we share the view of a
large number of top-ranking international legal experts
world-wide that the International Tribunal for
prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations
of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 was
established in the manner contrary to the UN Charter in
support of which we shall also present our arguments but
as the Tribunal does exist in fact as it functions and
keeps in custody several dozens of indicted persons, both
Serbs and Croats and Muslims, which from our viewpoint
and from the viewpoint of law is all the same, our
professional and human responsibility and conscience make
it incumbent upon us in this way, too, to try to
contribute to the respect of international law with
regard to all these indicted persons, no matter which
national grouping they belong to because they are all
equal before the law.
We
are, likewise, of the opinion that in the interest of
law, justice and peace, it would be useful in our region
for the Tribunal’s relevant Trial Chambers to
approach the Faculties of Law in Sarajevo, Zagreb and
other university centre in the space of the former SFRY,
whose scholars, whose competence we had the opportunity
to personally witness during many years of close
co-operation, also could make an important contribution
to ensuring consistent and impartial law enforcement with
respect to all the indicted for violations of
international humanitarian law. For our part, we have
been prompted to approach the Tribunal in this manner
also by the fact that unlike the state authorities from
other states formed in the space of the former SFRY that
care for the status and rights of their citizens being
held on trial at the Tribunal, as well as for the dignity
of their own state and peoples living in it, our state
authorities do not perform their duty with respect to
their citizens and their country but, as a rule, are
doing precisely the opposite. Nevertheless, we wish by
our remarks and suggestions to promote justice and
respect for law, also relative to the citizens of other
states from the region, believing it to be our duty to
adopt a strictly professional attitude on this plane as
well and treat all equally.
In
the text below, we shall present (I) our view of the
legal validity of the acts establishing the Tribunal, but
would not discuss that topic further, since the Tribunal
actually exists and tries people and that in these
proceedings in every case international law should be
observed; as well as (II) our general observations
regarding the set-up and the works of the Tribunal, which
our representatives would present in more specific terms
on each individual case if the relevant Trial Chambers
would grant permission for appearance in the proceedings
in the amicus curiae capacity.
ABSENCE
OF LEGAL GROUNDS FOR ESTABLISHING THE HAGUE
TRIBUNAL IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ACTS
The
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was
established by UN Security Council resolutions
808/93 and 827/93 and, as explicitly stated in
these acts, in accordance with Chapter VII of the
UN Charter.
However,
the legal grounds of the acts establishing the
Tribunal, can be challenged, i.e. it can be noted
with full certainty that the said Security
Council resolutions were adopted in contravention
of the UN Charter. The Tribunal’s
establishment is legally problematic, i.e.
contrary to the valid rules of international law
and primarily the UN Charter, on several grounds.
To
start with, the Security Council is the UN
executive organ responsible for taking care of
peace and security world-wide and as such it may
not establish judicial organs. It has the right
to establish its subsidiary organs (Article 29 of
the Charter stipulates: "The Security
Council may establish such subsidiary organs as
it deems necessary for the performance of its
functions"), but as it itself has no right
to perform any judicial function, it cannot
transfer to its subsidiary organ any powers that
it does not hold (and within the powers it has,
it may not transfer to its subsidiary organs the
decision-making right, because this is the
Security Council’s exclusive right that is
exercised according to a strictly prescribed
procedure). This interpretation is also confirmed
by Article 28 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Security Council adopted on 24 June 1946 based on
Article 30 of the Charter (that is still, even
after 55 years, called "Provisional Rules of
Procedure"). This Article of the Rules of
Procedure reads as follows: "The Security
Council may appoint a commission, a committee or
a rapporteur for a specific question". A
year after the adoption of the Charter, the
Security Council, where the representatives of
the key UN founding members played a dominant
role, notably important figures such as Ernest
Bevine, Georges Bidault, Joseph Paul-Boncour,
Edward R. Stetinius Jr., Andrei Y. Vyshinsky,
Andrei A. Gromyko, etc. that may virtually be
considered the Charter’s authentic
interpreters, thus interpreted in the mentioned
way which subsidiary organs the Security Council
might have.
In
addition, the Security Council’s competence
under Article 24 of the UN Charter is the
following:
"1.
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by
the United Nations, its members confer on the
Security Council primary responsibility for the
maintenance of international peace and security
and agree that, in carrying out its duty under
this responsibility, the Security Council acts on
their behalf.
2.
In discharging these duties, the Security Council
shall act in accordance with the purposes and
principles of the United Nations."
As
part of the thus defined function, the Security
Council’s key task is to take care of
respect for the principle set forth in Article 2,
item 4 of the Charter, according to which:
"All Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state or in any
other way inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations." In case this principle is
violated, i.e. that there is "a threat to
peace, violation of peace or aggression"
(Article 39 of the Charter), the Security Council
may decide on the implementation of measures
(diplomatic, economic-financial and military),
that must be based on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter
and whose aim it is to maintain or restore peace
and security in the world. In international law,
i.e. the part of it concerning war and peace,
there is a traditional division into the rules
concerning the right to war (jus ad bellum)
and the rules regulating the rules of warfare,
therefore, those that are applied when the war
has already broken out in order for the war as an
otherwise inhumane phenomenon, to be made as
humane as possible, i.e. to alleviate the horrors
(this is about the so-called right in war – jus
in bello). With its above mentioned role of
taking care of peace and security in the world,
i.e. of respecting the ban on the threat of force
and the use of force, the Security Council is an
organ that looks after the implementation of the
rule jus ad bellum. International criminal
law, for its part, has as its aim, primarily to
prevent and punish criminal behaviour during war
conflicts, i.e. it aims at humanising warfare,
i.e. primarily falls under the framework of
"the law in war"- "jus in bello".
Of the criminal offences within the framework of
international law, it is only the so-called
"crimes against peace" fall within the
framework of "jus ad bellum",
i.e. it is only by these criminal offences that
the rules within the framework "jus ad
bellum" are violated, while all other
criminal offences fall within the framework of
"jus in bello". The Statute of
The Hague Tribunal stipulates that this Tribunal
shall try virtually all offences within the
framework of international criminal law except
crimes against peace, i.e. all the offences with
the exception of those directed against peace and
security in the world. Therefore, of all
international criminal offences, The Hague
Tribunal does not deal only with those offences
that violate the values for whose preservation
the Security Council is responsible (but, the
Security Council does not ensure the preservation
of those values through any judicial but through
its executive function). Consequently, the
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,
through its judicial function, does not prevent
precisely the offences that violate the values
for whose protection the Security Council is
responsible, meaning that the aims that it has to
attain and the aims of the Security Council whose
subsidiary organ it is, are not the same.
It
follows that the Security Council was not
authorised to establish the Tribunal neither from
the standpoint of the nature of its function nor
from the standpoint of the aims that it aspires
to fulfil.
In
addition to the above mentioned, the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, is a Tribunal only for crimes
committed in a particular space, i.e. in the
territory of several states formed following
their secession from the former Yugoslavia. In
addition to this Tribunal, such a tribunal exists
only for Rwanda. On the other hand, the criminal
offences of the same nature were committed and
are being committed in war-torn areas the world
over. It is not only that selective justice
cannot be considered true justice, but this
selectively established justice also contravenes
the principle of sovereign equality of states
proclaimed in Article 2, item 1 of the UN
Charter.
In
support of the above arguments, we shall recall
the indubitable authority of Professor Mohammed
Bedjaoui, President of the International Court of
Justice. In his book "The new world order
and the control of the legality of the Security
Council acts" ("Nouvel ordre mondiale
et controle de la legalite des actes du Conseil
de Securite", Bruxelles, 1994), he included
in the eight Security Council resolutions that he
considered legally most disputable and that
would, as such, be the first to be subjected to
control, also the two mentioned resolutions on
the establishment of the ad hoc Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia – resolutions
808/93 and 827/93.
The
only legally valid way in which an international
war crimes tribunal may be established is the one
resorted to in Rome in 1998, when the Statute was
adopted of the Permanent International Criminal
Court of a general jurisdiction. Regrettably,
this Statute has not yet come into force due to
the insufficient number of instruments of
ratification.
Since
the Security Council is a political organ and
since its decisions are of a political nature and
given that in international law it is considered
legitimate and permissible for the states to
oppose the implementation of political decisions
taken by international organisations, including
the UN, that are unlawful, it may be possible to
conclude that the mentioned Security Council
resolutions whereby the Tribunal was established
do not create legally valid obligations from the
standpoint of international law and law in
general. With respect to the UN Security Council,
this conclusion stems from Article 25 of the UN
Charter, which reads as follows: "The
members of the United Nations agree to accept and
carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the present Charter." In
its advisory opinion of 21 June 1971 (in the case
of the legal consequence of the protracted
presence of South Africa in Namibia despite
Security Council resolution 276/1970), the
International Court of Justice confirmed that the
states are not duty-bound to accept and implement
the Security Council decisions that are not in
accordance with the Charter, which would, by the
way, be clear by itself even if it were not
written anywhere.
Nevertheless,
as we have already noted, despite the mentioned
objections related to the legal grounds of the
Tribunal’s establishment, we have decided to
request that our representatives be allowed to
appear before the Trial Chambers in all the
mentioned cases in accordance with Rule 74 on
Procedure and Evidence. We proceed from the fact
that the Tribunal exists and functions and from
our wish for international law to be respected in
all the mentioned proceedings.
THE
SET-UP AND WORK OF THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL IS CONTRARY
TO INTERNATIONAL LAW PRIMARILY IN THE FIELD OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
What
poses a particular problem when the Hague Tribunal is
concerned is the fact that both its set-up and the method
of work are, to a considerable extent, contrary to a
number of rules in international law, particularly those
in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Especially important among these rights are those
stipulated in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, adopted and open for signature by UN
General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December
1966, that took effect on 23 March 1976, as one of the
central documents adopted internationally. The
Tribunal’s rules are often contrary also to the
general legal principles as recognized by the civilized
nations and particularly the general principles of
criminal, substantive and procedural law having universal
value (legality of sanctions, two-instance court
proceedings, division of legislative and judicial
functions, etc.). It is also noteworthy that the Hague
Tribunal works also in contravention of a number of
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, as well as the practice of the
European Court of Human Rights.
Finally,
a number of Rules of Procedure and Evidence as well as a
number of practical procedures before the Tribunal run
counter to the rules of the indicted person prescribed in
Article 21 of the Tribunal’s Statute that correspond
to the rules stipulated in Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, so
that our remarks concerning respect for Article 14 of the
Covenant as a rule also apply to respect for Article 21
of the Statute.
Mentioned
below are just some of the most important violations of
international law that appear in the Tribunal’s
set-up plan and in its works.
Legislative
and judicial functions are mixed
The
Tribunal appears both as a legislative and as a
judicial body. The judges write the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence themselves and are
authorised to amend them (Article 15 of the
Statute titled "Rules of Procedure and
Evidence" stipulates: "The judges of
the International Tribunal shall adopt the Rules
of Procedure and Evidence for work pending trial,
for the conduct of court proceedings and
appellate proceedings, for the acceptance of
evidence, for the protection of victims and
witnesses, as well as for other relevant
issues". They, therefore, both make law and
apply it.
The
Rules of Procedure and Evidence are frequently
amended. In eight years of the Tribunal’s
existence, it developed eighteen amendments to
the Rules. Such frequent amendments of the Rules
lead to legal insecurity.
The
legal insecurity and inadequacy of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence is also augmented by the
fact that right from day one they represented a
mixture of different systems and that their
interpretation often largely depends on the judge
that is applying them and particularly on the
legal system and tradition in the framework of
which he was trained. Such a nature of the rules
and their too frequent amendments make it
impossible to establish a stable court practice.
As a result, neither the defence nor the
prosecutors nor the judges themselves are able to
fully follow and master this practice.
What
additionally undermines legal security is also
the fact that the English and the French versions
of the Rules do not always coincide as well as
the fact that with respect to some issues, there
is a discrepancy between the Rules and the
Statute (which is an act superior to the Rules)
so that the judges, at their own discretion, have
the possibility to opt for solutions that are
more convenient to them at the given moment. The
discrepancies of the mentioned types that will be
presented in this paper are only a part of these
discrepancies.
The
absence of separation of the legislative function
from the judicial function also gives the judges
the possibility and the authorisation to
interpret these Rules depending on circumstances
and without any control. The defence has no means
or possibility to challenge the interpretation of
these rules by the Tribunal even if that
interpretation is evidently incorrect. It does
not have either the possibility to challenge the
legality of these rules even in cases when they
evidently contravene the Statute’s
provisions which often happens in practice as we
shall see from some examples in the text below.
The
prosecutor’s and the judge’s functions
are mixed
According
to its Statute, the Tribunal was established as
the "International Tribunal for the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991". This is how it was
defined also in the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.
Consequently,
judging by the text of the Statute, the
Tribunal’s task is prosecution. This is
clearly not a normal function of a court that
should try the accused (the French version of the
Statute, true, is more correct than the English
version because it stipulates that the Tribunal
shall "try in court" (juger) –
"Le Tribunal international penal pour juger
les personnes presumees responsables de
violations graves du droit international
humanitaire commises en ex-Yougoslavie depuis
1991" – however, in the text of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the word
"juger", meaning ‘try in
court’, has been replaced by the word
"poursuivre", meaning
"prosecute").
Both
versions (the English and the French) of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence take the English
version of the definition from the Statute.
Describing the institution under discussion as
the "International Tribunal (Court) for the
prosecution of persons responsible for serious
violations of international humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former
Yugoslavia since 1991".
The
mentioned inappropriate determination of the
Tribunal’s function is not solely limited to
linguistic imprecision. It finds its practical
implementation also in the fact that the Tribunal
(i.e. the Trial Chambers and the
Prosecutor’s Office) represents a single
organisational unit with a joint Secretariat.
Such institutional unity of the Prosecutor’s
Office and the Court is unacceptable and
inconceivable in any modern judicial system.
Further
materialisation in the mentioned definitions of
the proclaimed "prosecuting" role of
the Tribunal is also effected through its actions
that are characterised by violations of a number
of rights of the indicted persons and prevention
of providing adequate defence which will be
discussed later on.
What
is also indicative in the mentioned definitions
is the fact that the Tribunal was established to
prosecute "persons responsible…".
Defining things in this way runs counter to the
modern legal and social achievements, namely, in
contemporary world, any normal judicial system is
characterised by the fact that courts try
"indicted persons" who are presumed
innocent until proven guilty (Article 14,
paragraph 2 of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights stipulates:
"Everyone charged with a criminal offence
shall have the right to be presumed innocent
until proved guilty according to law."; a
similar provision is also contained in Article 21
paragraph 3 of the Tribunal’s Statute, but
this provision runs counter to the manner in
which the Tribunal has been defined and the way
it functions). The mentioned French versions of
the Statute and the Rules go even a step further
to deny this fundamental premise of modern
justice and they indicate that the Tribunal shall
try in court or prosecute "persons presumed
responsible…" ("les personnes
presumees responsables…").
This
establishment of the "presumption of
guilt" does not remain solely verbal but
also has its practical implementation, to be
discussed later on.
Violation
of the two-instance proceedings principle
Article
14, paragraph 5, of the International Covenant on Civil
and political Rights, prescribes the right to
two-instance proceedings in the following way:
"Everyone convicted of a crime shall have the right
to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher
tribunal according to law." The mentioned provision
evidently presumes a distinction between a lower and
higher judicial instance, a thing considered normal and
commonplace in all modern legal systems.
At
the Hague Tribunal, the same judges are members of both
first-instance (the term "first-instance" is
used in the French version of the text, while the
appropriate term from the English version is
"Trial") and Appellate Chambers. Namely, Rule
27 on Procedure and Evidence reads:
"Rule
27
Rotation
Permanent
Judges shall rotate on a regular basis between
the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber.
Rotation shall take into account the efficient
disposal of cases.
The
Judges shall take their places in their new
Chamber as soon as the President thinks it
convenient, having regard to the disposal of
part-heard cases.
The
President may at any time temporarily assign a
member of a Trial Chamber or of the Appeals
Chamber to another Chamber."
A
judge, therefore, may be in a first-instance Chamber in
one case and a member of the Appeals Chamber in another.
Therefore, the decision of every judge acting as a member
of a first-instance Chamber are subject to control by
other judges who are in that case members of the
second-instance Chamber, whereas in other cases that very
same judge takes part in second- instance proceedings in
the control of the work of these other judges that now
appear as members of second-instance Chambers. This is
how the system of mutual cross-control functions,
impeding clear two-instance nature in trials and may
result in deviations primarily towards a benevolent
attitude and confirmation of first-instance decisions
made by other judges when acting in second-instance
proceedings, so that they can be expected to reciprocate
this benevolence when their roles are reversed.
This
double position of judges undermines considerably their
independence and impartiality.
This
organisation also gives the judge the possibility to take
part in decision-making as a second-instance judge and at
the same time to apply the stands from such decisions as
the court practice established in second- instance
proceedings in cases that he tries as a judge in
first-instance proceedings.
The
paradoxical possibility for the same judge to decide on
the same legal issue in one case within the framework of
a first-instance Chamber and at the same time in a second
case within the framework of an Appeals Chamber gives
this judge a legally unacceptable benefit of providing to
his stand and first-instance decision simultaneously the
legal force and the confirmation of judicial practice
established at the second-instance level.
The
true unacceptability of such a rule that allows the same
judges to participate both in first-instance and Appeals
Chambers is further strongly accentuated by the fact that
the rotation does not take place under any rules laid
down in advance, but according to the decision of the
President, who is authorised at any moment to temporarily
assign a judge to another Chamber.
The
rules on detention and the practice when ordering
detention – breach of the right to liberty
Before
the Tribunal, detention is a rule and temporary
release an exception (Rule 64 stipulates that
"upon being transferred to the seat of the
Tribunal, the accused shall be
detained…", whereas Rule 65, paragraph
(A): "once detained, an accused may not be
released except upon an order of a
Chamber").
This
contravenes international law and particularly
the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. In its Article 9, this Covenant proclaims
the right to liberty as one of the basic human
rights. Article 9, paragraph 3, inter alia,
stipulates: "It shall not be the general
rule that persons awaiting trial shall be
detained in custody…".
The
judges of the Hague Tribunal are not duty-bound
to elaborate on their arrest warrants and
detention decisions. This contravenes Article 9,
paragraph 2 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which reads:
"Anyone who is arrested shall be informed,
at the time of arrest of the reasons for his
arrest and shall be promptly informed of any
charges against him". This situation also
contravenes principle 11/2 of the UN General
Assembly resolution 173 (XLIII) of 8 December
1988, titled "A set of principles for
protecting all persons placed in any form of
custody or detention", according to which:
"The person placed in detention and possibly
his Defence Counsel shall be communicated without
delay and in full the arrest warrant and the
reasons explaining it".
Detention
pending trial before The Hague Tribunal is of an
indefinite duration. In practice, detention
pending trial lasts very long and, bearing in
mind the length of the trial itself, this problem
becomes even more pronounced and more
unacceptable. This long detention contravenes the
first sentence of Article 9, paragraph 3 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. It reads as follows: "Anyone
arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall
be brought promptly before a judge or other
officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power and shall be entitled to trial within a
reasonable time or to release".
Too
long a detention pending trial is not consistent
with the court practice of the European Court for
Human Rights that applies the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms where
detention is limited to up to two years (in the
FRY law it is up to six months). In the case of
Momir Talic, the two-year period of detention is
just about to expire and the trial has not even
begun.
At
The Hague Tribunal, there is no right to
compensation of damage in case of unlawful
detention either. This contravenes Article 9,
paragraph 5 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which reads:
"Anyone who has been the victim of unlawful
arrest or detention shall have an enforceable
right to compensation".
Legality
of sanctions
Article
15 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights prescribes:
"1.
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal
offence on account of any act or omission which
did not constitute a criminal offence, under
national or international law at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier be imposed
than the one that was applicable at the time when
the criminal offence was committed.
…
2.
Nothing in this Article shall prejudice the trial
and punishment of any person for any act or
omission which at the time when it was committed
was criminal according to the general principles
of law recognised by the community of
nations."
This
is about the rule of criminal and international
law that usually finds expression in the
sentence: "Nulum crimen sine lege, nula
poena sine lege", and also comes under
the corps of the universally accepted basic human
rights.
When
it comes to the legality of determining the
criminal offences which are tried before The
Hague Tribunal, this legality cannot be called
into question even when it is about the offences
committed before the Tribunal’s Statute was
adopted. For, they were stipulated as such by
different international instruments (Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the Geneva Conventions on International
Humanitarian Law), as well as by national
Criminal Codes. However, no international norm
envisaged sanctions for violation of
international humanitarian law before the
Tribunal’s Statute adopted in May 1993.
Penalties are prescribed for the crimes from this
group stipulated by the Criminal Law of SFR
Yugoslavia and all the states formed in that
space. Namely, for each offence a separate
minimum and maximum penalty may be imposed within
the scope of the general minimum and maximum
penalty applicable in the respective legal
systems.
However,
the Tribunal’s Statute stipulates penalties
very vaguely. This is inappropriate for modern
criminal law. Article 24 of the Tribunal’s
Statute prescribes:
"The
first-instance Chamber shall pass only prison
sentences. When determining the terms of imposing
a prison penalty, the first-instance Chamber
shall be guided by the general practice of
passing prison sentences applied by the courts in
the former Yugoslavia."
The
former Yugoslavia’s Criminal Code stipulated
as the heaviest penalty the term of imprisonment
of up to 15 years and exceptionally a 20-year
term but only as a substitute for the death
penalty.
However,
the Tribunal’s Rule of Procedure and
Evidence also contravene even the thus formulated
Article 24 of the Statute. Namely, Rule 101
stipulates the possibility of passing a life
sentence: "The persons found guilty by the
Tribunal may be given a term of imprisonment that
may go up to life sentence". In addition, it
is noteworthy that the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence, as a document containing procedural
rules should not even regulate the term of
imprisonment because this is an issue governed by
criminal substantive law.
This
evident discrepancy between the Rules and the
Statute as the superior of the two cannot be
denied by the claim that the quoted Article 24 of
the Statute recalls the conditions of serving
prison sentences in the former Yugoslavia.
Namely, it is clear that that provision concerns
the duration of prison sentences in the former
SFRY as this was the only thing that could be
determined by the courts. The same cannot be said
of the conditions of imprisonment that the courts
do not deal with. The French version of the
Statute is even more explicit on the matter.
Namely, instead of the expression "general
practice regarding prison sentences in the courts
of the former Yugoslavia", this version uses
the words "la grille generale des peines
d’emprisonnement appliquee par les Tribunaux
de l’ ex-Yougoslavie ("General
frameworks for determining prison sentences
applied by the courts in the former
Yugoslavia". The term "grille"
denotes the frameworks, i.e. the permitted range
for determining the length of prison sentences.
This interpretation of ours is also confirmed by
the UN Secretary General’s report of 3 May
1993, which clearly states that: "when
determining the duration of prison sentence, the
first-instance Chamber shall be guided by the
general frameworks for determining prison
sentences applied in the courts of the former
Yugoslavia".
Finally,
it should be pointed out that in its practice so
far the Tribunal passed prison sentences largely
exceeding the maximum prison sentence that could
be passed in the formed SFRY.
Absence
of reasons for exclusion of criminal
responsibility
Neither
the Statute nor the Rules envisage any reason for
the exclusion of criminal responsibility.
However, modern criminal law, i.e. the general
principles of criminal and international law,
generally recognise and accept the existence of
reasons for the exclusion of criminal
responsibility (such as necessary self-defence,
extreme need, coercion, etc.).
In
its practice, too, the Tribunal does not take
into account the existence of such circumstances.
For example, in the case of Drazen Erdemovic, the
Tribunal refused to treat coercion as a basis for
the exclusion of responsibility but simply as an
extenuating circumstance when deciding how heavy
a penalty to impose. (According to
Erdemovic’s claim, which the Tribunal
accepted as justifiable, he had actually been
threatened with death unless he committed the
crimes of murder for which the Tribunal later
tried him).
Violation
of the right to defence by treating elements
relevant for defence as confidential
In
its work, the Tribunal has the possibility to issue
sealed indictments (Rule 53 on Procedure and Evidence,
titled "Non-disclosure of Indictment",
paragraph (A) stipulates: "(A) In exceptional
circumstances, a Judge or a Trial Chamber may, in the
interests of justice, order the non-disclosure to the
public of any documents or information until further
order."). One cannot challenge the right of the
prosecuting organs to prosecute suspects without
disclosing that they are after them. However, it is not
legally acceptable and sustainable that a given person is
aware that proceedings have been initiated against him
and, in particular, that the indictment has been issued
against him without making it possible for him to learn
why he is being prosecuted and by keeping that fact
confidential. Thus, for instance, in the case against
Zeljko Raznatovic Arkan, the Tribunal announced that
Arkan had been indicted without letting the public or the
accused learn about the contents of the indictment.
We
also wish to point out that the quoted provision (which,
as such, is itself inappropriate for modern law)
stipulates the keeping of indictments confidential (even
vis-à-vis the accused), as well as other documents and
information as an exception while, in practice, this is
increasingly becoming a rule.
The
prosecutor forwards too late to the Defence Counsel the
data on the identity of the witnesses and the victims, as
well as these witnesses’ allegations, i.e. the
claims regarding the victims against the accused, so that
the Defence Counsel does not have enough time to collect
data and evidence to possibly refute all these
allegations and claims. The Tribunal tries to justify
this practice by reasons of security of the witnesses and
the alleged victims. However, an institution that has at
its disposal all the means available to the Tribunal
quite certainly will not find it a problem to
simultaneously provide security to witnesses and alleged
victims and give the accused and his Defence Counsels
enough time to prepare the defence.
An
extreme scenario based on this approach is the
possibility, permitted under Rule 75 on Procedure and
Evidence, to keep the identity of a witness or a victim a
total secret until the very end and for the witness to be
heard by means of various technical devices (picture or
sound distorting devices or closed-circuit television; by
giving a witness a pseudonym, etc.). These methods make
it impossible to establish a given person’s
identity. Such action makes it impossible for the Counsel
to prepare the defence and by its nature opens up the
possibility for manipulation rather than contributing to
protecting a given person. Namely, when a witness is
heard on an actual event that has really taken place, the
accused can conclude based on the actual contents of the
witness hearing which particular person is speaking, so
that keeping identity a secret does not make much sense.
However, it gives exceptional advantage to false
witnesses and victims, who may make statements without
any risk to themselves about something that never
happened. Namely, their identity is kept a secret and the
accused cannot conclude who they are based on the
contents of their statement as they testify about
something that never happened.
The
above mentioned methods are used in particular to violate
Article 14 on the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights that protects the right of the accused
in the proceedings and whose paragraph 3, inter alia,
stipulates that:
"3.
In the determination of any criminal charge against him,
everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum
guarantees, in full equality:
to
be informed promptly and in detail in a
language which he understands of the
nature and cause of the charge against
him;
to
have adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of his defence and to
communicate with counsel of his own
choosing;
…."
The
above mentioned methods also violate the similar
provisions of Article 21, paragraph 4, items a) and b) of
the Tribunal’s Statute.
Disproportionate
difference between the terms of work of the
Prosecutor’s Office and the Defence
The
Prosecutor’s Office has disproportionately
more favourable terms of work than the terms and
means available to the Defence. Not only is this
unfair but also, inter alia, violates the
right to defence, particularly in the part
concerning the above quoted Article 14, paragraph
3, item b) of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (as well as Article 21,
paragraph 4, item b) of the Tribunal’s
Statute).
Namely,
the Prosecutor’s Office has offices in
several towns in the territory of Yugoslavia, has
a large number of investigators and an unlimited
capacity of access to all cases before the
Tribunal. The Defence Counsels do not have any of
this, i.e. have it but to a much more moderate
extent. Thus, for instance, in some of the cases
(particularly those against the highest officials
of the Republika Srpska that are on trial -
Momcilo Krajisnik and Biljana Plavsic), the
problem arose of actual feasibility for the
Defence Counsels to read all the documents
submitted by the Prosecutor’s Office that
have so many pages that the usual group of
several Counsels would need several years of
full-time work to read only once the contents of
the submitted documents.
The
costs of litigation before the Tribunal are so
high that no accused can afford to pay them. The
Tribunal pays Defence Counsels ex officio
and the amounts of their fees are exceptionally
high, particularly if viewed from the Yugoslav
perspective and measured by our yardsticks.
However, in real terms, even these amounts are
inadequate to meet the overall needs for a
quality defence compared to the formidable means
and possibilities available to the
Prosecutor’s Office. In addition, by
employing this method of paying the Attorneys,
which is a rule rather than an exception, which
would be normal, the Tribunal’s Secretariat
keeps the Defence under control and undermines
its independence.
Violation
of the principle "audiatur et altera
pars" in some cases
Rule
94 on Procedure and Evidence, paragraph (A)
stipulates that: (A) A Trial Chamber shall not
require proof of facts of common knowledge but
shall take judicial notice thereof". This
rule, otherwise widely accepted in procedural
legislation, becomes problematic before The Hague
Tribunal because allegations made by the mass
media are often considered as generally accepted
facts related to the Yugoslav crisis and have, as
a result of frequent repetition, acquired the
character of notorious facts. In a situation when
the judges, as a rule, do not have enough
preliminary knowledge about the overall context
of the events underlying the ongoing proceedings,
which will be discussed later on, the mentioned
procedural possibility poses a big treat to the
accused placing him at a great disadvantage.
Paragraph
(B) of the same rule prescribes: "(B) At the
request of a party or proprio motu, a
Trial Chamber, after hearing the parties, may
decide to take judicial notice of adjudicated
facts or documentary evidence from other
proceedings of the Tribunal relating to matters
at issue in the current proceedings".
Notwithstanding the fact that it is obliged to
previously hear the parties, meaning to also give
the possibility to the accused to plead, the
Trial Chamber may take as proved, even if the
accused challenges them, the facts established in
the course of some other proceedings before the
Tribunal since the quoted provision only
envisages the obligation to hear the parties but
not the obligation to supply proof again if the
accused (or possibly the Prosecutor) claims that
these facts have not been correctly established.
Although the facts already proved in another case
are at issue here, perhaps the facts proved in
these other proceedings are not important for the
accused to the extent that he would challenge the
Prosecutor’s allegations thereon; namely,
they do not significantly affect the verdict in
that case and therefore the accused may not wish
to enter into a debate thereon. However, in the
case where later on these very same facts are
taken as established and proved, they may be of
major importance to the accused and the accused
will not be given the possibility for presenting
new evidence. Given that in different cases the
accused are different and that the
Prosecutor’s Office is the same in all of
them, and given that the Prosecutor’s Office
decides when it will issue a particular
indictment, it has the possibility to adjust the
sequence of indictments submitted, so that the
same disputable issue in particular earlier
proceedings will appear as an issue of no
particular importance to the accused. In some
later proceedings, however, the same issue may be
of crucial importance to the contents of the
verdict and the position of the accused and may
make the accused in the later-on initiated
proceedings face a situation where he will not be
able to challenge the Prosecutor’s
allegation that will decide his fate.
In
the mentioned way, the anyway inequitable
position of the Defence vis-à-vis that
Prosecutor is additionally aggravated and the
right of the accused to effectively challenge the
Prosecutor’s allegations and succeed in
having evidence supplied in his favour is
seriously undermined. And this right is also
stipulated and protected by Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (as well as by Article 21 of the
Tribunal’s Statute).
Inadequate
qualification of the Tribunal’s judges to
try people due to lack of knowledge of the
historic, political and civilisation context in
which the events of relevance to the trial took
place
In
the Tribunal’s work so far, the ignorance is
in evidence among judges and the officials of the
Prosecutor’s Office (Chief Prosecutor,
Deputy Prosecutor and other personnel in the
Prosecutor’s Office) of the social and
historic milieux in which the events under trial
took place and in which the protagonists of those
events, including the accused, lived and came
from. These officials have come from different
parts of the world and, as a rule, do not even
speak the languages spoken in the former SFRY.
Their knowledge of the history, political
situation, customs, habits, and other
civilisation features of the region, is more than
inadequate and often based almost exclusively on
the knowledge gained through the media. To
illustrate this by an example, at the trial of
the Celebici case, when one of the judges asked
who the Ustashi mentioned in the proceedings
were, the Prosecutor did not know how to answer.
This
situation leads to the judges, whose
half-knowledge and ignorance are otherwise based
on information gained through the media, falling
prey in the course of proceedings to further
manipulations and accepting claims also based on
media and other propaganda campaigns. All this
leads to the accumulation of untruths and
half-truths that are increasingly difficult to
challenge. Even the Prosecutor’s
Office’s stands are sometimes drastically
unfavourable for the accused not out of malice
but due to inadequate knowledge or a distorted
perception of particular issues that people at
the Prosecutor’s Office have.
Having
in mind the perception of the Yugoslav crisis
world-wide, its causes, historical background and
development, this state of affairs clearly
produces negative effects primarily and to the
largest extent against the accused on the Serb
side.
Disrespect
of the assumption of innocence/ establishment of
the assumption of guilt
We
have seen that The Hague Tribunal has been
defined as the organ for "the prosecution of
persons responsible" (i.e. according to the
French version "persons presumed
responsible") and that its set-up, where the
institutional inseparability of the court
Chambers and the Prosecutor’s Office
prejudices the the necessary impartiality of
trials required by modern law, and particularly
respect for the presumption of innocence
stipulated in Article 14, paragraph 2, of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which reads: "Everyone charged with
a criminal offence shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according
to law." (the presumption of innocence is
even stipulated in Article 21, paragraph 3, of
the Tribunal’s Statute, although the
Tribunal has been defined, set up and is
functioning in contravention of that
presumption).
Disrespect
for the presumption of innocence/ establishment
of the presumption of guilt has in practice been
particularly pronounced through the presentation
of the indictments of the general context in
which the events on trial took place and
particularly in the indictments against
high-ranking military or political leaders. These
presentations of the general context often make
up quite a large part of the total text of the
indictments. Through this general context, a
political situation is described where whole
peoples are charged with particular behaviours,
with the "political guilt" of the Serb
people coming to full expression (hegemonic
aspirations, terror against minorities, ethnic
cleansing, aspirations towards creating a Greater
Serbia, etc). This, by the way, contravenes the
principle of individual responsibility that has
been generally accepted in modern criminal law.
It also contravenes the raison d’etre
of any criminal court, including The Hague
Tribunal, that was, as is often mentioned in the
debates in its favour, established precisely in
order to remove collective responsibility from a
people for the crimes committed by individuals.
Based on the established claims within a general
context, individual responsibility is then
derived. Namely, the thus established general
context further allows the Prosecutor - at least
according to his own view of things and as can be
unequivocally concluded from his behaviour - to
provide very scant information on what
specifically the defendants did, when, where and
against whom they committed the crimes they are
charged with, etc. As a result, the accused face
a situation where they have to defend themselves
both against the general context allegations and
against inaccurate concrete allegations, in fact
to defend themselves against whatever one can
conclude based on such indictments that the
Prosecutor has charged them with.
The
broadly defined and perceived concept of
so-called "command responsibility" also
contributes to undermining the assumption of
innocence and the request for individual and
subjective responsibility. Here, the relationship
between the accused and the event for which he is
on trial can be so distant and indirect that
neither according to his formal powers nor
according to his real influence he could have
contributed to either the direct commission of
the given crime or could have prevented it in any
way, nor could he even have learned about it. A
typical example is the case of Momcilo Krajisnik
who, as President of the Assembly of Republika
Srpska, could not have either formally or
factually influenced the events and crimes that
he is blamed for.
In
a situation when an individual’s
responsibility is largely based on a broad
political and even historic context and in a
situation when neither the judges nor the
employees of the Prosecutor’s Office have
any sufficient knowledge about that context, as
already mentioned, it is hardly possible to
establish facts correctly and apply law in an
appropriate manner. There are even certain absurd
situations, as in the Tadic case, for instance,
when the Prosecutor arguing in favour of the
claim on the continued tendency among Serbs
towards the "ethnic cleansing" of other
peoples also proposed a study of a certain
"expert witness" whose identity had
been kept confidential (expert witness P) and
proved the mentioned tendency by referring to a
paper by historian Vasa Cubrilovic presented on 7
March 1937 to the Serbian Cultural Club.
Cubrilovic was in favour of Yugoslavia concluding
a treaty on the exchange of population with
Turkey and possibly with Albania, just as already
done by other Balkan countries following the
Balkan wars, and the practice commonplace at the
time, which only we had not resorted to.
Cubrilovic presented the mentioned proposal in a
private capacity, as a scholar, and, as is well
known, this proposal was never accepted by the
authorities.
In
determining the above mentioned general
political-historical-legal context, it is
noteworthy that there is a discrepancy between
the claims made by the Prosecutor’s Office
and the contents of the decisions made by the
Tribunal and presentations by some of the judges,
who are incidentally eminent legal experts, in
their research papers. Thus there is in the
indictments the claim that the former Yugoslav
republics decided to ‘leave’
Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. This is regarded as
acceptable whereas the political reactions of the
Serbian people are treated as criminal acts (the
establishment of the municipal communities
permitted under the Constitution, or of the
representative bodies through which they could
articulate their interests, etc.). That Serbian
people does not wish to be dominated by other
nations in the separated republics and wishes
either to preserve the SFRY or to remain even in
the truncated Yugoslav state or even to have its
own canton in the seceded republic. At the same
time, one of the most eminent judges of the
Tribunal and its former President Professor
Antonio Cassese in his book Self-Determination of
Peoples, A Legal Re-Appraisal (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1995) noted that
secession (external self-determination) by the
former Yugoslav republics contravened both
international law and the Yugoslav constitutional
system. This drastic difference in the assessment
of events is of crucial importance when
determining the above mentioned context because
in the given example the reactions of the Serb
people represented the defence of their own
rights against the unconstitutional secession
that was contrary to international law. The
claims by the Prosecutor and the statements by
the Tribunal were contrary to certain generally
known facts – thus it is generally known
world wide that in Yugoslavia which according to
claims was dominated by the Serbs from 1945 to
1980 virtually absolute power was wielded by
Josip Broz Tito who was half-Croat and
half-Slovene as well as that after that there was
a practically con-federal system in place that
did not allow the predominance of any of the
republics (those better versed and the
Prosecutor’s Office and the Tribunal should
be among them, know that the percentage of Serbs
in the SFRY was lower than the percentage of
Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that in the period
from the Second World War up to the outbreak of
the war in the early 1990s only one Serb served
as Federal Prime Minister, notably Petar
Stambolic in the 1960s, that in the JNA the
command over the most important sectors like air
force, air defences, the Navy, etc. was almost as
a rule given to Croats and Slovenes and that the
percentage of Serbs in the JNA command staff was
lower than the percentage of the Serbs in the
total population, etc.).
Violations
of human rights protected by International Law
during the arrest and the transfer of the accused
to the Tribunal
The
Rule 58 of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal
stipulates: "The obligations laid down in
Article 29 of the Statute shall prevail over any
legal impediment to the surrender or transfer of
the accused or of a witness to the Tribunal which
may exist under the national law or extradition
treaties of the State concerned."
We
shall not at the moment tackle in detail the
question whether an act of a hierarchically
inferior legal power, which is supposed to deal
only with the procedure and evidence before the
Tribunal (since the legislative competence
conferred to the judges by the Statute of the
Tribunal is limited to those questions only), can
determine the relations between a superior act
and some other acts of a different nature. But we
could observe that the above quoted article does
not include the obligation of respect of the
human rights guaranteed by the International law
during the arrest and the transfer of the accused
to the Tribunal (this obligation cannot in any
way be derogated since those rights belong to the
jus cogens).
In
many cases the accused were arrested, either by
the state authorities or by some informal groups,
outside the procedures prescribed by national
laws and they were transferred to the Tribunal
also without applications of such procedures.
Those accused were also deprived of the right to
the protection by a court. This was the case for
example with Mr. Milomir Stakic, Mr. Momir Talic,
Mr. Dragan Nikolic, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, Mr.
Steve Todorovic, Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, the twins
Mr. Miroslav and Milan Vuckovic etc.
The
above mentioned conducts are contrary in the
first place to the provisions of the Article 9
paragraphs 1 and 4 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights which reads as
follows:
"Article
9
1.
Everyone has the right to the liberty and the
security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty except on such grounds
and in accordance with such procedure as are
established by law.
.
. .
4.
Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest
or detention shall be entitled to take
proceedings before a court, in order that that
court may decide without delay on the lawfulness
of his detention and order his release if the
detention is not lawful."
The
above mentioned conducts are also in
contravention of similar provisions of other
international documents as well as of general
principles of criminal procedure as recognized by
civilized nations.
Since
the persons in question were arrested and
transferred to the Tribunal in an unlawful way,
they are entitled to a restitutio in integrum.
Breach
of the provisions of the Tribunal’s Statute
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence in
atypical conditions of trying Slobodan Milosevic
Finally,
in the case against Slobodan Milosevic that is taking
place in an atypical manner, as a result of his refusal
to recognise the Tribunal, when the accused appeared
before the Tribunal for the first time, the indictment
should have been read out to him in accordance with
Article 20 of the Statute and Rule 62 of Procedure and
Evidence. This was not done because the Tribunal
interpreted the accused ’s reply to the question of
whether he wished to be read out the indictment that was:
"That is your problem" as the accused ’s
refusal to have it read out to him. The Tribunal was
under the obligation to read out the indictment
nevertheless in accordance with the mentioned Articles
and the defendant’s reply, which was neither
negative nor positive but boiled down to a refusal to
give a reply, should by no means have been interpreted as
negative and, contrary to the defendant’s interest,
make the Tribunal decide not to read it out because this
was a question relating to the defendant’s
procedural right where the interpretations must always go
in the direction which favours the accused more.
Given
the mentioned omission it can be considered that the
proceedings against Slobodan Milosevic was not initiated
in a legally proper manner.
*
*
*
Bearing
in mind all of the above examples and our wish to
contribute to all the trials before the Tribunal taking
place in accordance with international law and that human
rights and fundamental freedoms of the accused be
respected and that the perpetrators of violations of
international humanitarian law are tried and judged in a
legally proper manner based on facts, we propose that the
relevant Trial Chambers should approve to us, the members
of the following group, to appear, each of us as a
representative of the whole group, before them and
present the stands on issues regarding respect for
international law in the given proceedings:
Professor
Kosta Cavoski,L.L.D.
Professor
Zagorka Jekic,L.L.D.
Professor
Ljubisa Lazarevic
Professor
Ratko Markovic,L.L.D.
Professor
Zoran Stojanovic,L.L.D.
Professor
Djordje Lazin,L.L.D.
Professor
Mirjana Stefanovski,L.L.D.
Assistant
Professor Aleksandar Jaksic,L.L.D.
Assistant
Professor Milan Skulic,L.L.D.
Assistant
Professor Branko M.Rakic,L.L.D.
Assistant
Professor Sasa Bovan,L.L.D.
Assistant
Aleksandar Gajic
Assistant
Bojan Milisavljevic
www.icdsm.org
|